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Introduction 
It is generally accepted that taxes and tax evasion are intrinsically linked; that one cannot 
exist without the other.  As a result of a great deal of theoretical, experimental, and empirical 
research conducted over the last twenty years, there exists an extensive knowledgebase regarding 
tax evasion by individuals.  However, research regarding tax evasion
1 by businesses is, by 
comparison, surprisingly modest. This is startling, given the importance of businesses and their 
decisions not only in economic models but also in tax system and the economy as a whole. 
There is some evidence to suggest that there is cause for concern, and that a substantial 
share of business income goes unreported to the relevant tax authorities.  The United States 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) routinely estimates the total amount of under-reported income 
and overstated deductions, and calculates the total loss of tax revenue, or the “tax gap”.  The 
latest data from the IRS (2004) regarding the “tax gap” related to business activities are for the 
2001 tax year.  These estimates indicate that: (1) the corporate tax gap amounted to $29.9 billion, 
of which corporations with over $10 million in assets contributed $25.0 billion; (2) the tax gap 
associated with business income earned by individuals amounted to $81.2 billion; (3) the self-
employed evaded $61.2 billion in employment tax; and (4) corporations underpaid the amount of 
taxes due based on reported income by $2.3 billion.  In total, businesses evaded $174.6 billion in 
taxes, which amounted to almost 10% of total taxes paid voluntarily.  This is not an insignificant 
amount and yet should be considered a lower bound estimate because: it is based on twenty year 
old compliance rates; it does not include businesses that do not file tax returns (also known as 
non-filers, the hard-to-tax, ghosts or informal businesses); and/or it does not consider firms that 
 
1 The focus of this paper is on illegal tax evasion and not legal tax avoidance.  Tax evasion or tax non-compliance 
refers to income tax that is legally owed but is not reported or paid whereas tax avoidance refers to legal actions 
taken to reduce tax liability.  Tax avoidance includes such activities as “…purchasing tax-exempt bonds, which is 
certainly legal, not at all nefarious, but also certainly done for tax reasons.”  (Slemrod  2004, 4)   3
are engaged in illegal activities.  While these data are for the United States, it is not unreasonable 
to assume that firms evade taxes in every country around the world. 
Given that there is some evidence which supports the notion that businesses engage in tax 
non-compliance, several questions arise and require investigation.  First, do businesses around 
the world engage in tax evasion or is it confined to a few countries or regions?  Second, does the 
legal status of the business (e.g. sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, etc.) affect the 
incidence and/or intensity of tax evasion?  If so, then it may be possible to effect changes in the 
legal system in order to increase tax compliance.  Third, do businesses that engage in tax non-
compliance share common and observable characteristics, or is there too wide a variety of shapes 
and sizes to permit a useful generalization about them?  If it were possible to define a typical 
evader, the tax authority could target their auditing activities more accurately.  Finally, while 
there is considerable agreement internationally about the factors that trigger tax non-compliance 
(e.g. the tax burden, the degree of regulation, the level of enforcement, confidence in 
government, labour force characteristics, and morality), how do these features influence the 
intensity of non-compliance?  With this information, policy makers could effect changes to 
increase the amount of tax revenues collected from businesses. 
  One of the main constraints to investigating and attempting to provide answers to these 
and related questions, is the lack of data.  Previously, the only data sources available were from 
tax audits.  However, these sources were only available for a very small number of select 
countries, the data was costly to collect, and access to the data was limited.  More recently, 
however, an alternative data source, that is conducive to investigating issues related to business 
tax non-compliance, has become available.  The World Business Environment Survey (WBES) 
was launched in 1999 by the World Bank’s Investment Climate and Institute Units.  The survey   4
was administered to more than 10,000 firms in eighty countries in late 1999 and early 2000, and 
provides responses to multiple questions on the investment climate and business environment.  In 
particular, firms were asked several questions that permit an investigation into the linkages 
between firm characteristics, economic policy, governance, competitive environment, and other 
factors, as well as the extent and intensity to which firms are hiding output from the tax 
authority.   
 Batra  et al. (2003) also use the WBES to investigate the determinants of under-reporting 
by firms.  They estimate OLS regressions, including country fixed effects, and find that: (1) 
“…small or medium-size firms that produce for the domestic market (non-exporters), lack 
foreign investment, and are located in large cities (but not necessarily in the capital) tend to 
engage more in unofficial activity” (Batra et al. 2003, 76); (2) the prevalence, though not the 
unpredictability, of corruption also significantly affects non-compliance; and (3) “…a firm’s age, 
sector or mode of ownership do not influence [a firm’s] under-reporting of revenue.” (Batra et al. 
2003, 78).  Unfortunately, the authors do not link their choice of explanatory variables to the 
existing theoretical or empirical literature regarding firm tax non-compliance.  As a result, some 
potential controls are overlooked and some controls may be mis-specified and/or its inclusion 
unclear to the reader.  For example, the authors include a control for privately owned firms, but 
do not indicate how this is defined (e.g. does it include private corporations) and also results in 
the base category including a diverse range of firm organization categories.  Both of these issues 
may result in firms being grouped together that the previous literature indicate may have 
differing compliance behaviour (e.g. public corporations).  This paper surveys the existing 
theoretical and empirical literature of firm tax non-compliance and use the information from 
these studies to build the empirical model explored in this paper.   5
                                                
 In  addition,  Batra  et al. (2003) do not exploit the nature of the dependent variable.  The 
firm’s response regarding under-reporting behaviour is grouped into categories.  When a 
quantitative outcome is grouped into known intervals on a continuous scale, the data are said to 
be “interval-coded”.
2  However, Batra et al. (2003) define the dependent variable as a binary 
outcome for each category and estimate the resulting equations by Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS). In addition, the equations are not all identically specified.  The considerable statistical 
limitations of such a linear probability model are well known, and it is not clear if the results can 
be compared across regressions, given the different specifications.  There is an estimation 
technique that has been developed specifically for interval-coded data.  This estimation 
procedure is known as “interval regression” and is undertaken using maximum likelihood 
techniques.  The interval regression technique is utilized in this paper and the extent to which 
various covariates affect the estimation results is also explored.     
  Overall, the findings reveal that firms which are sole proprietorships, partnerships or 
privately owned corporations report a smaller percentage of their sales to the tax authority, 
though these effects become insignificant when country controls are included in the 
specification.  The previous literature has suggested that: (1) public corporations should be more 
compliant, but no such effect is found in this paper; and (2) firms in the service and construction 
sector should be less compliant, but it is found that firms in the service sector are more compliant 
and that there is no significant effect for the construction sector.  There is no consensus in the 
previous literature about the relationship between firm size and under-reporting, but it is found, 
unambiguously, that small firms are less compliant than are large firms.  Foreign owned firms, 
exporters, and firms that have audited financial statements are also more compliant, as was also 
 
2 When the intervals are unknown and have to estimated along with the other parameters, an ordered logit/probit is 
the preferred estimation framework.   6
found by other researchers, but, quite surprisingly, government ownership has an insignificant 
effect.  Not surprisingly, organized crime, high taxes, and government corruption all result in 
lower compliance.  Finally, the results indicate that firms around the world engage in tax non-
compliance but, holding all else constant, compliance is highest in OECD countries (notably 
Canada, France and Italy) and the lowest in Latin American (particularly, Haiti, Panama and 
Peru) and African & Middle Eastern (principally, Tunisia, Egypt, West Bank-Gaza, and Ghana) 
countries. 
The paper begins with a brief review of the relevant tax non-compliance literature.  The 
WBES is then described and the rationale for the empirical techniques is outlined.  The results 
are then summarized and the paper ends with some concluding comments. 
 
Literature Review 
In this section, attention is focused on two critical aspects of the literature regarding tax 
evasion.  First, a review the development of the theoretical literature and the associated 
predictions is provided, commencing with the classical model of an individual’s decision to 
evade taxes and how the model has been modified for firm behaviour.  Second, there have been a 
few empirical papers that explore firm tax non-compliance, and this literature is summarized 
along with the key findings.  This literature will help shape the empirical model utilized in this 
paper. 
   7
                                                
Theoretical Studies 
  As noted above, extensive literature exists on tax evasion by individuals and the seminal 
contribution was provided by Allingham and Sandmo (1972).
3  Their model was sparse but 
surprisingly robust in modeling an individual’s decision to evade taxes and, if so, how much to 
evade.  The model leads to four propositions about the incidence of tax evasion: (1) the rate of 
return to evasion is positively related to the incidence of tax evasion; (2) individuals with higher 
risk aversion tend to evade less; (3) individuals with higher personal income tend to evade more; 
and (4) and compliance is positively related to the probability of being audited and the size of the 
penalty if caught.
4  The first and third propositions leads one to conclude that, in the context of 
business tax non-compliance, the self-employed, sole-proprietors and other small businesses 
would be less likely to evade taxes than large businesses.  The fourth proposition leads to the 
opposite conclusion, given that large businesses and corporations are normally subjected to 
audits at a higher rate than are smaller businesses.
5  However, the true effect of these 
propositions is muddied when the choice is not only the level of evasion but also the level of 
output, as with most businesses, and when there is no direct link between the owner’s income, 
risk preference, audit probability, and evasion decisions.  This is particularly true for businesses 
where evasion decisions are made by managers and not the owner(s).  
 
3 The Allingham-Sandmo (1972) model has been extended in a number of dimensions over the last thirty years (e.g. 
Watson 1985, Trandel and Snow 1999, Mookherjee and P’ng 1989, Border and Sobel 1987, Scotchmer 1987, 
Cremer, Marchand and Pestieau 1990, and Sanchez and Sobel (1993))  and this literature is nicely surveyed by 
Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002). 
4 The relationship between tax rates and tax evasion, however, is uncertain.  A higher tax rate implies less income 
which, according to the model, implies less evasion.  On the other hand, an increase in the tax rate implies that the 
“return” from evasion increases as well, assuming a constant penalty, which implies more evasion.  As a result, the 
two forces are of opposite tendency which makes the net result uncertain.  
5 For example, in the United States corporations with more than $10 million in assets face an audit rate of nearly 100 
percent.   8
                                                
Given the above discussion, the reasons driving many businesses to evade taxes, is likely 
different from that of individuals and, hence, should be modeled differently.  There is a much 
smaller pool of literature that addresses tax non-compliance by businesses.
6  The majority of this 
work utilizes the basic framework of the Allingham-Sandmo (1972) model, but the key variation 
in these models is that they explore how the tax rate, probability of detection, and penalty rate 
affect the two choices of evasion and output.
7  In these models, it is found that: (1) reported sales 
decrease as the tax rate increases; (2) a rise in taxes increases the market price of the good, but 
by less than the amount of the tax, since some of the tax increase is absorbed through increased 
evasion; and (3) an increased probability of detection or penalty, increases the proportion of sales 
declared and the market price of the good.  As opposed to the propositions of the Allingham-
Sandmo (1972) model, there is an unambiguous positive relationship between the tax rate and 
tax evasion.  Further, it should be noted that these results hold, regardless of whether the market, 
in which the firm is operating, is competitive or monopolistic.  
The preceding literature, however, continues to assume that an individual is at the centre 
of the tax decision.  That is, the above noted firm models assume that the firm owner makes the 
tax reporting decision.  This assumption, however, likely only applies to small, closely-held 
businesses and the outcomes predicted by the Allingham-Sandmo (1972) model may not apply to 
other types of businesses, notably those businesses where financial decisions, including those 
related to taxes, are not made by the owner/shareholder but, rather, by their agents.  With this in 
mind, Chen and Chu (2002) extend the standard model to include a firm that hires a risk-averse 
manager.  As opposed to the finding of the Allingham-Sandmo (1972) model, that an individual 
will only evades taxes if the rate of return from evasion is greater than the rate of return from 
 
6 Cowell (2003) provides an excellent review of this literature. 
7 There is no agreement in this literature if the firm in these models should be modeled as risk-averse or risk neutral.   9
compliance, Chen and Chu’s model implies that a firm will evade tax only when the expected 
profit from evasion is significantly greater than that from reporting honestly.  This is because tax 
evasion by a business actually involves the interaction of many persons and is much more 
complicated than individual income tax evasion.   
Crocker and Slemrod (2003) focus particularly on large, publicly held corporations and 
propose a model of corporate tax evasion in the context of the contractual relationship between 
the shareholders of a firm and the chief financial officer (CFO), who determines the firm’s 
deductions from taxable corporate income.  The incentives of the CFO to engage in tax evasion 
are affected by the nature of the compensation arrangement.  The model implies that corporate 
tax evasion is reduced when penalties are imposed on the CFO directly, as opposed to the 
shareholder; and that tax evasion increases if the CFO’s compensation contract optimally adjusts 
to offset the penalties imposed when evasion is detected.   
 
Previous Empirical Studies of Business Tax Non-Compliance 
 
Unfortunately, the empirical analysis of business tax evasion is not extensive, mainly due 
to a lack of data.  There have, however, been a small number of empirical studies that will be 
summarized here. 
One of the first empirical examinations into business tax non-compliance focused on the 
self-employed.  The self-employed are commonly believed to have lower compliance rates than 
wage and salary earners.  Smith et al. (1986) obtain estimates that indicate that in 1982 the self-
employed in Great Britain understated their income in the range of 30 to 36%.  Pissarides and 
Weber (1989), using the same data, improve on Smith’s approach and find that the self-
employed under-reported their income by 90%.  This modified approach was subsequently   10
                                                
applied by: (1) Apel (1994) who estimates that the self-employed in Sweden under-reported their 
income by 25% in 1988, though this figure rises to 35% for the self-employed who own firms 
that are unincorporated (which supports the proposition that the legal organization of the 
business does effect the tax evasion decision); (2) Mirus and Smith (1997) concentrate their 
analysis on Canada and obtain an estimate of 12.5% for the year 1990; and (3) Schuetze (2002), 
who also applies the approach to Canada, finds that the self-employed under-reported their 
income by between 11 and 23% over the period from 1969 to 1992 and that the construction and 
service occupations are more likely to be involved in tax non-compliance.  Lyssiotou et al. 
(2004) propose further modifications and conclude that the self-employed in Great Britain in 
1993 under-reported their income by 118% if they were in blue collar occupations and 64% if 
they were in white collar occupations.  Finally, Tedds (2005) introduces a nonparametric 
framework to the approach and found that the gap between true and reported self-employment 
income is larger for households at the lower end of the self-employment income distribution, a 
result which runs contrary to the theoretical prediction of the Allingham-Sandmo (1972) model.   
A self-employed person, however, can register their business in a variety of forms, 
including a corporation, which, based on the theoretical literature, likely effects their tax 
compliance behaviour.  Unfortunately, only Apel (1994) explored the relationship between tax 
non-compliance and the legal form of the business, largely due to the lack of information on the 
latter in the data employed by these studies. 
Smith and Adams (1987) examine the extent of tax non-compliance by informal suppliers 
in six “at risk” sectors
8 using results from a survey commissioned by the U.S. Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) on the expenditures made by consumers on goods and services provided by these 
 
8 They were: home repairs and additions, domestic services, auto repair, music lessons, appliance repairs, cosmetic 
services, and catering.   11
                                                
suppliers.  For the 1992 tax year, the authors find that unreported income by these informal 
suppliers amounted to approximately US$59.6 billion and that informal suppliers tend to report 
only about 20% of their net business income.  
Using firm level data from a 1997 survey of private manufacturing firms in Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and the Ukraine, Johnson et al. (2000) investigate the relationship 
between government corruption, criminal activities, and firm tax compliance.  The dependent 
variable (percentage of sales that are unreported to the tax authority) is similar to that used in this 
paper from the WBES (discussed below), except that it is a continuous variable (rather than 
grouped data as in the WBES).  The authors found a positive and significant relationship 
between under-reporting of sales and bribing of corrupt officials, but no relationship between 
under-reporting of sales and protection payments to the mafia, tax payments, or efficiency of the 
legal system.  Finally, firm tax non-compliance is greater in Russia and the Ukraine than in the 
other countries. 
Several studies have investigated business tax non-compliance using data from tax audits.  
Probably the most comprehensive tax audit dataset in the world is that available through the U.S. 
IRS Tax Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP).
9  Rice (1992) used TCMP data from 1980 
to investigate tax compliance by small corporations (defined as corporations with assets between 
$1 and $10 million).  His findings suggest four key results.  First, compliance is higher among 
publicly traded corporations, which he attributes to the requirement that publicly traded 
 
9 The TCMP features data from a random sample of individual and small corporate income tax returns filed in a 
given year that were subject to intensive audits by experienced examiners.  For certain groups, such as non-filers and 
proprietors who tend to not report a significant amount of their income, the results from special research studies are 
used to supplement TCMP data.  Finally, data for large corporations are obtained from routine operational audits.   12
                                                
corporations must disclose more information to the public about their operations.
10  Second, high 
profit companies are more likely to under-report their income, and corporations whose profits are 
below the industry mean tend to resort to non-compliance, perhaps as a means of limiting costs.  
Third, the marginal tax rate is negatively associated with compliance.  Finally, firm size and tax 
non-compliance are positively related, and corporations engaging in tax non-compliance appear 
to be geographically bundled.  Joulfaian (2000), using TCMP data from 1987, found that non-
compliant corporations are three time more likely to be managed by executives who have evaded 
personal taxes.  TCMP data has also been used to explore tax evasion by the self-employed and 
these studies include Christian (1994), Erard (1992), and Joulfaian and Rider (1998). 
Giles (2000) discusses some of the factors that determine the probability of non-
compliance among a very large population of New Zealand businesses that were audited by the 
Inland Revenue Department in that country between the period 1993 and 1995. Contrary to Rice, 
Giles finds that an increase in the scale of the business, regardless of how this is measured, 
unambiguously raises the probability of compliance, once other characteristics are controlled for.  
That is, businesses that are relatively small, in terms of sales revenue or before-tax profit, are 
more likely to evade taxes than are large corporations, all other things being equal.  Businesses in 
the “construction”, “wholesale trade”, “retail trade”, “accommodation”, and “cafes and 
restaurants” sectors exhibited below-average compliance rates over the study period.  He also 
considered several other characteristics that were found to be important in reducing the tax 
compliance rate among New Zealand businesses. Relatively “inefficient” businesses tended to be 
less compliant than more efficient ones, where efficiency was defined as either “return on net 
assets”, or “activity ratio” (sales as a percentage of net assets).  In addition, businesses which 
 
10 Tannenbaum (1993), however, disagrees with this statement and instead argues that higher compliance could be 
the result of managers in these corporations having greater independence from the owners.   13
were registered off-shore were generally more compliant than their on-shore counterparts, again 
once the analysis controlled for other attributes. Finally, it was found that in general, an 
aggressive use of legitimate tax-minimization instruments (such as the deduction of interest and 
depreciation costs, and the writing-off of bad debts) tended to be associated with compliant 
behaviour. 
  Many countries use tax holidays to attract foreign investment by providing a limited 
period of tax exemptions and reductions for qualified investors.  Chan and Mo (2000) examine 
the effect of tax holidays on foreign investors’ tax non-compliance behaviour in China.  They 
analyzed 583 tax audit cases, made available by the Chinese tax authorities, on corporate tax 
non-compliance by foreign investors.  Their results indicate that the corporate taxpayers tax 
holiday position significantly affects non-compliance, notably: (1) companies in the pre-holiday 
position are least compliant; (2) companies are most compliant in the tax exemption period that 
has a zero tax rate and a heavy penalty for evasion; (3) domestic market-oriented companies 
have a higher rate of non-compliance than their export-oriented counterparts; and (4) wholly 
foreign-owned and manufacturing-oriented companies have higher compliance than joint 
ventures and service-oriented companies. 
  This literature makes it clear that a businesses legal organization (private versus public, 
and owner versus employee managed) likely affects the decision to evade taxes but other factors, 
such as firm size, have ambiguous effects or, at the very least, vary across countries.  Therefore, 
it seems worthwhile to conduct a worldwide study of firms tax compliance behaviour. 
   14
                                                
Data 
  In 1998, the World Bank Group launched its World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES).  The WBES used many of the same questions from the enterprise survey conducted for 
the  1997 World Development Report
11 (World Bank 1997) but expanded the number of 
businesses and countries surveyed and the questions/issues covered.  During late 1999 and early 
2000, face to face interviews
12 were conducted with either the firm managers or owners of 
10,080 firms in eighty countries (plus the West Bank and Gaza).   
The purpose of the survey was to assess and compare the business environment in a large 
number of countries.  To achieve this goal, the survey gathered information regarding the firm’s 
characteristics, such as size and ownership structure, as well as responses to multiple questions 
on the investment climate and the local business environment as shaped by domestic economic 
policy, governance, regulatory, infrastructural, and financial impediments, as well as assessments 
of public service quality.   A more detailed description of the survey can be found in Batra et al. 
(2003).  After eliminating observations with non-response related to key variables (described 
below), a maximum sample size of 6,025 firms remains.  
  
Dependent Variable 
  As was indicated above, the intent of this paper is to explore the relationships between 
firm characteristics and tax compliance using firm-level data collected from around the world.  
How can the WBES be used to investigate firm tax compliance?  The WBES asks each firm the 
question 
 
11 Unfortunately, this dataset neither contains detailed information on characteristics of the firms nor the key 
variable of interest contained in the WBES dataset.  As a result, it cannot be appended to the WBES dataset. 
12 With the exception of Africa where interviews were predominantly conducted by mail.   15
                                                
What percentage of total sales would you estimate the typical firm in your area of activity 
reports for tax purposes?  Possible answers:  (1) less than 50%; (2) 50-59%; (3) 60-
69%; (4) 70-79%; (5) 80-89% (6) 90-99%; and (7) all (100%).
13
The distribution of answers is given in Table 1.  This table shows that 60% of firms worldwide 
indicate that the typical firm fails to report their sales in full to the tax authority and, of those 
firms, over 19% of them fail to report more than half their sales.  This shows that business tax 
compliance is a significant issue.  Not surprisingly, there appears to be some difference in 
perceived tax non-compliance across regions, as is shown in Figure 1.  In particular, in OECD 
countries only approximately 40% of firms are perceived to under-report their sales to the tax 
authority and of those, approximately 50% fail to report only up to 10% of their sales.  Further, 
compared to other regions, firms in Latin America and Asia perceive that significantly more 
firms fail to report less than 50% of their sales.  In addition, there are significant differences in 
perceived firm tax compliance across countries.  Given these differences, the effects of country 
and region specific dummy variables on the results will be investigated in the empirical analysis. 
 
Explanatory Variables 
As was outlined above, previous empirical work using audit data found relationships 
between tax non-compliance and various firm characteristics, which these relationships will also 
be explored using this data.  The firm characteristics that will be included as explanatory 
variables include dummies for: industry sector, and firm size, age, ownership, exporter, whether 
the firm’s financial statements are audited, legal ownership, and number of competitors.  In the 
 
13 In the WBES, the dependent variable is actually coded as follows: What percentage of total sales would you 
estimate the typical firm in your area of activity reports for tax purposes?  Possible answers:  (1) all (100%); (2) 90-
99%; (3) 80-89%; (4) 70-79%; (5) 60-69%; (6) 50-59%; and (7) less than 50%.  The order of the responses is 
revered solely for expositional clarity. 
   16
secondary analysis, the effect of various perceived business obstacles on tax compliance will be 
investigated, including access to capital, taxes, and regulations, organized crime, government 
corruption, inflation, and exchange rates.  As the sample size decreases due to non-response with 
the inclusion of these latter explanatory variables, they are only included in a secondary 
regression.    
Table 2 categorizes the maximum 6,025 observations, sorted by region and displayed by 
country.  Table 3 provides a summary of the key variables.  All of the explanatory variables used 
in the analysis are dummy variables and these are discussed below. 
 
Legal Status 
Firms in the WBES are categorized as being either: sole proprietorships, partnerships, 
cooperatives, private corporations, public corporations, or other.  The first two categories (sole 
proprietorship and partnership) are much more likely to operate with the owner making the tax 
evasion decisions, so these firms are grouped together for this analysis.  The remaining 
categories are treated individually, particularly as it is unclear if a cooperative would behave 
more like a private or public corporation.  The excluded category is “other”. Based on the 
literature, it is expected that publicly traded corporations will be the most compliant.  In most 
countries, publicly traded corporations have a greater probability of being audited; and are 
subject to public disclosure requirements and independent financial auditing, which tends to 
expose any under-reporting behaviour to the authorities.  As audit levels and detection 
probability are greater, compliance should be higher. 
   17
Sector 
Firms are categorized into one of four possible industry sectors.  They are: services, 
agriculture, construction, and manufacturing.  The omitted category is manufacturing and it is 
expected that, as found previously, firms in the services and construction sector will be less 
compliant than others. 
 
Size 
Rice (1992) and Giles (2000) each investigated the relationship between a firm’s size and 
tax non-compliance.  Rice (1992) defined a firm’s size according to the dollar amount of assets it 
held and found a positive relationship between firm size and tax non-compliance.  Whereas, 
Giles (2000) used a firm’s sales revenues and before tax-profits, and found a negative 
relationship between firm size and tax non-compliance.  These measures of firm size are not 
available in the WBES.  Instead, this paper investigates a firm’s size as defined in terms of the 
number of employees.  A small firm is one with fewer than 50 employees, a medium-sized firm 
has between 50 and 500 employees and a large firm has over 500 employees:  The omitted 
category is firms with between 50 and 500 employees.  The relationship between firm’s size and 
tax compliance remains unclear. 
 
Competition 
While not previously investigated, it is possible that there is a positive relationship 
between the number of competitors in a given market and tax non-compliance.  For example, 
firms in highly competitive markets may resort to tax non-compliance in order to reduce costs 
and allow the firm to set a lower price for their goods and/or increase the firm’s profits.  The   18
WBES asks firms how many competitors they face in their market.  Possible answers are; none, 
between one and three; and more than three.  The omitted category is firms with between one 
and three competitors.   
 
Age 
The WBES includes information on the firm’s age - specifically, if the firm is less than 
five years old, between five and fifteen years old, and greater than fifteen years old.  The effect 
of a firm’s age on tax compliance is ambiguous.  For example, younger firms may be less 
compliant because they may have more competitors, may be struggling to turn a profit, and/or 
may view tax evasion as a way to cut costs.  On the other hand, young firm may be more reliant 
on external financing, which could cause them to be more compliant.  
 
Other Characteristics 
Other firm characteristics include indicators of whether the firm is foreign or government 
owned, an exporter, and whether it subjects its financial statements to audits.  Based on previous 
findings, all of these indicators are expected to be negatively related to non-compliance.   
Dummies controlling for region as well as country (listed in Table 2) are also investigated.  The 
omitted categories are the OECD and the United States respectively. 
 
Perceived Obstacles 
In addition to recording information regarding the firm’s characteristics, the WBES also 
asks a number of questions about the firm’s perceptions of various constraints in the business 
environment, which likely influence operational decisions including tax compliance.  While   19
                                                
many of these variables have a low response rate, several have a relatively higher response rate.  
In particular, firms are asked if the following items present an obstacle or are a constraint to 
conducting business: access to capital
14, inflation, exchange rate, political instability, organized 
crime, taxes, and regulations.  If these issues are perceived by the firm as affecting their ability to 
conduct business, then they may result in the firm engaging in tax non-compliance in order to 
reduce costs and be more competitive.   
In addition, firms are asked if: (1) it is common to pay some “irregular” additional 
payments to government officials; and if (2) laws and regulations that affect the firm are 
interpreted inconsistently by the government or courts.  If corruption is common, then among 
other effects, it will increase the cost of business, reduce morality, and reduce a firm’s 
confidence in government; all of which are likely to have a negative relationship with tax 
compliance.  The relationship between tax compliance and inconsistency in the application of 
laws and regulations is more ambiguous.  If a firm can individually garner the favour of the 
government(s) and/or courts in the interpretation and application of laws and regulations, then 
this may reduce tax non-compliance.  On the other hand, if the firm does not benefit from this 
inconsistency, then it may resort to tax non-compliance.  Taking account of these explanatory 
variables reduces the number of available observations to 4,561.  
 
14 Andreoni (1992) argues that “…individuals facing binding borrowing constraints may use tax evasion to transfer 
resources from the future to the present.  Even if a person finds tax evasion undesirable in the absence of borrowing 
constraints, it could become desirable if a borrowing constraint is binding.  Tax evasion, therefore, may be a high-
risk substitute for a loan.” (Andreoni 1992, 35-36).  The same argument can apply to firms and hence its inclusion in 
this analysis.   20
                                                
Data Strengths and Weaknesses 
Using the WBES dataset to investigate business tax non-compliance has advantages and 
disadvantages over audit data.
15  The main disadvantage of the WBES is that the questions of 
interest are asked about the perceived behaviour of other firms, rather than the behaviour of the 
firm being interviewed, and this may result in response bias.  However, there are two things to 
consider.  First, respondents are likely base their response, at least in part if not in whole, on their 
own behaviour, which would minimize the bias.  Second, as the firms are being asked about the 
behaviour of other firms rather than their own, they will not feel stigmatized by the interviewer 
and/or fear possible repercussions when responding to the questions.  In addition, the WBES 
does not explicitly allow for the possibility of over-reporting.  Rice (1992) found that about 6% 
of all corporations overstate their taxable income to some extent.  Firms may over-report due to a 
misinterpretation of tax laws, to avoid a tax audit, to secure financing, or particularly for public 
corporations, to appear more competitive.  In the WBES, firms that over-report will likely be 
included in the full compliance category.  Finally, the WBES does not allow for the tax gap to be 
calculated.  The tax gap is the difference between the taxes paid and the taxes that should have 
been paid.  Such a calculation is useful in determining the amount of tax revenues lost to non-
compliance.  A disadvantage shared by both the WBES and audit data is that neither data source 
includes “ghosts” (Erard and Ho, 2001), firms that operate solely in cash and avoid normal 
business obstacles and regulations. 
The main advantages of the present dataset include the fact that: (1) audit data are not 
widely available, unlike the WBES, which covers eighty countries; (2) audit data only include 
firms that are selected (for diverse reasons) or caught by the tax authorities, while the WBES is a 
 
15 Audit data also have several disadvantages, which are discussed by Rice (1992).   21
                                                
random sample of firms; and (3) the WBES includes additional information that is not included 
in tax audits. In particular, factors that firms perceive as business obstacles, such as taxes and 
regulations, which may effect a firm’s decision to under-report, are included.   
 
Empirical Framework 
The survey question which forms the basis for our dependent variable and is described 
above refers to categories.  As a result, a firm’s perceived reporting behaviour is not directly 
observed.  Rather, firms are categorized on the basis of the percentage of sales that they perceive 
to be unreported.  When a quantitative outcome is grouped into known intervals on a continuous 
scale, the data is said to be “interval-coded”.  An ordered probit (or logit) is ideal when the 
dependent variable is discrete, ordinal in nature, and when the categories or thresholds are 
unknown.
16  In this case, the thresholds are estimated along with the model’s coefficients and the 
variance of the error term is normalized to be one.  It is possible, however, to modify the ordered 
probit model so that the thresholds are fixed at their known values and only the models’ 
coefficients and the error variance are estimated.  This estimation procedure is known as 
“interval regression” and is undertaken using maximum likelihood techniques.  Its key advantage 
over the ordered probit is that it provides an asymptotically more efficient estimator as it uses the 
known threshold information and involves estimating fewer parameters.  It is also preferred to 
OLS, as OLS on the grouped dependent variable model is inconsistent. 
The following is the general setup of the model and is based on the discussion contained 
in Stewart (1983) and Wooldridge (2002, 508-509).  The responses for the dependent variable 
 
16 That is, for an ordered logit model, while it can be said that two is greater than one, it cannot be determined if the 
difference between two and one is somehow twice as important as the difference between one and zero.  The latter is 
not true of interval coded data. are coded 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 to capture seven distinct sales under-reporting categories.  Let   
denote the observable ordinal variable coded in this way and let   denote the underlying 




th firm.  This can be expressed as a linear 
function of a vector of explanatory variables   using the following relationship:  i x
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It is assumed that   is related to the observable ordinal variable   as follows: 
*
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The last interval is treated as open-ended to account for possible sales over-reporting.  If it is 
further assumed that  , then the seven possible components of the general 
log likelihood function for the i
) , ( ~ |
2 ' ' * σ β β i i i x N x y
th individual is expressed as: 
                                                 
17 It could be argued that this interval should be between 1 and 50 because firms that report 0% of their sales would 
likely be operating completely as “ghosts” and would not have been selected for an interview since there would be 
no formal record of the firm.  Treating the interval in this way, however, does not affect the results. )}
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(3) 
where   denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal, ,  (·) 
denotes the natural logarithmic operator, and I[·] is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 
when the statement in the square brackets is true and 0 when it is false.  The relevant part of the 
log-likelihood is then triggered by the indicator function for whether the individual falls within 
one of the seven categories in question.  The maximum likelihood procedure now involves the 
estimation of the β parameter vector and the ancillary standard error parameter σ.   
Φ 1 ) ( = ∞ Φ e log
Unlike the situation with the ordered probit estimation, the estimated coefficients from an 
interval regression are interpretable as if   is observed for each i and estimated   
by OLS.  That is, the estimated coefficients can be interpreted as the marginal effects (i.e. the 
change in percentage of sales reported given a change in the independent variable, holding all 
else constant).  It should be noted that the estimates contained in the β parameter vector are only 
interpretable in this way due to the assumption that y* given x, satisfies the classical linear 
model assumptions.  If these assumptions do not hold then the interval regression estimator of β 
would be inconsistent.  As a result, it is important to test the key assumptions of functional form, 
homoskedasticity, and normality. 
*
i y β x x y E = ) | (
*
 
  23Diagnostic Tests 
Machin and Stewart (1990) discuss diagnostic tests for (pseudo) functional form for an 
ordered probit, which is easily modified for the interval regression model, and Chesher and Irish 
(1987) outline diagnostic tests for normality and homoskedasticity for the grouped data model.  
These tests are all score (or Lagrange Multiplier) tests for which the test statistics all take the 
form 
1 ' ) ' ( ' 1
1F F F F
− = ξ       ( 4 )  
where 1 is an n-dimensional vector of ones, and F is a matrix with row order n where each row 
contains the score contributions for all the parameters of the model.  ξ  can be easily calculated 
as n times the non-centered R
2 from a regression of 1 on the columns of F. 
The construction of the F matrices for these tests, which are described below, are based 
on computations of the pseudo-residuals.  Usually, residuals are defined as the difference 
between the observed and estimated values of the dependent variable.  However, the estimated 
values of the dependent variable obtained in the interval regression have no counterpart in the 
data.  Chesher and Irish (1987) provide the computational details for the pseudo-errors for the 
grouped model, denoted for the i
th individual as: 
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where  ) (⋅ φ denotes the probability density function for the standard normal, and aj-1 and aj denote 
the known interval parameters for individual i (e.g. if yi=2 then aj-1=50 and aj=60).  The pseudo-
residuals, ei, are obtained by replacing the unknown parameters in (5) with their maximum 
likelihood estimates.   
  24For the homoskedasticity and non-normality tests, higher-order moment residuals are 
required, specified as: 
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The higher-order moment residuals are obtained by replacing the unknown parameters in (6) 
with their maximum likelihood estimates.  The first four moment residuals are required for the 























       ( 7 )  
The F matrix, or score contributions, is obtained by multiplying the pseudo-residuals by the 
various auxiliary variables in question. 
 
Pseudo-Functional Form Test 
  The (pseudo) functional form test is a modified version of the RESET test (Ramsey 
1969).  F is given as 
) , ˆ ,..., ˆ , (
2 * 1 2 * 1 1 e y e y e x e F
K =       ( 8 )  
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  25Test for Homoskedasticity 
For the test of heteroskedasticity of unknown form, F is given as 
) ' , (
2 1 xx e x e F =
18      ( 9 )  




  Finally, F in the usual   test for zero skewness and/or excess kurtosis is given by  ) 2 (
2 χ
) , , , (
4 3 2 1 e e e x e F =    .     ( 1 0 )  
It should be noted that if either or both of the assumptions of normality and 
homoskedasticity are rejected, then the Huber (1967) “sandwich” estimator of the variance can 
be used in place of the conventional Maximum Likelihood variance estimator.  This estimator is 
expressed as: 
1 2 ' 1 )] ˆ ( )[ ( )] ˆ ( [ ) ˆ (
− − = β β β I x u x I Var i i i      (5) 
where   is the information matrix for the   vector, computed at the maximum likelihood 
estimates. 
) ˆ (β I β ˆ
  While it is worthwhile considering the results of the aforementioned tests, caution should 
be exercised when interpreting the associated results.  Orme (1990) has questioned the use of 
such score tests in the context of a simple binary probit and demonstrated their poor finite sample 
properties in this setting.  In particular, he notes that there is upward size-distortion. Assuming 
that these findings extend to the group model estimated in this study, the tests may indicate that 
the model does not satisfy the classical linear model assumptions when in fact it does.     
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18 When an intercept is estimated so that x always contains a unit element, e
2 
is redundant in the test for homoskedasticity. Results 
Estimation was undertaken using STATA 8.2 and was conducted using the ‘INTREG’ 
command.  The command needs two variables, denoted y1 and y2, to define the dependent 
variable.  In particular, y1 and y2 are used to hold the endpoints of the interval.  As our data are 
right-censored, the upper endpoint of ∞ is represented by a missing value.  Table 4 provides the 
concordances between yi, the associated interval, y1, and y2.  The model for the analysis is: 
*
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Table 3 provides a description of the above noted variables and Table 2 denotes the countries and 
regions available in the data.  The model is estimated with and without the “perception” 
variables, which are the variables in the square brackets, and with and without either controls for 
region or country. This produces a total of six possible models.   
  The associated results are presented in Table 5.  The first three columns relate to models 
without the perception variables.  Model 1 is the base model, while Model 2 includes regional 
controls, and Model 3 includes country controls.  The last three columns relate to models with 
the perception variables included.  Model 4 is the base model, while Model 5 includes regional 
controls, and Model 6 includes country controls.  The results for the diagnostic tests are 
presented near the end of the table.  In all cases, the null of homoskedasticity is rejected and the 
Huber (1967) “sandwich” estimator of the variance is used in place of the conventional MLE 
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variance estimator.  The null: (1) of normality for those models that include country controls; and 
(2) for the pseudo functional form test for all models except 1 and 4 is not rejected.  On the basis 
of these last two test results, Models 1, 2, 4, and 5 should be treated with caution as they fail to 
meet the necessary assumptions for estimator consistency. These results provide some evidence 
that Models 3 and 6 meet the necessary assumptions required for consistent estimates, 
particularly in light of Orme’s (1990) finding.  
  Various goodness of fit measures are also presented at the bottom of Table 5 for the 
relevant models.  Larger (less negative) log-likelihood values are indicative of a better fit. 
However, only log-likelihood values across models with the same samples can be compared.  
That is, the log-likelihood values for Models 1, 2 and 3 can be compared and for Models 4, 5, 
and 6 but not, for example, Models 2 and 5.  The R-square, for technical reasons, cannot be 
computed in the same way in interval regressions as it is in OLS regression.  Various pseudo R-
square measures, however, have been proposed, but there is no generally accepted measure.  
Veall and Zimmermann (1996) recommend the measure of McKelvey and Zavoina (1975), 
which is reported in the various results tables.
19  The log-likelihood function and the R-square 
measure are larger for those regressions that include the country controls.  Tests of the joint 
significance of the explanatory variables are all significant and the region/country controls are 
also jointly significant.  As a result of the goodness of fit and diagnostic tests, the preferred 
models are models 3 and 6. 
  The main results will now be discussed.  The coefficients represent the marginal effects 
and can be interpreted as the impact of the firm’s characteristic or perception variable in 
percentage terms on the share of sales that are reported for tax purposes.  A positive (negative) 
 
19 The McKelvey and Zavoina (1975) R-square is computed in STATA with the 'fitstat' command. 
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estimate means that the variable is associated with greater tax compliance (non-compliance).  In 
those specifications that do not include country controls, the coefficient associated with firms 
that are sole proprietorships/partnerships and corporations is negative. The results for Models 1 
and 2 indicate that sole proprietorships report approximately 5 to 5.5 percentage points less of 
their sales to the tax authority, and this rises to between 6 and 7.5 percentage points in Models 4 
and 5.  These variables, however, are not significant in the models with country controls, the 
preferred models based on the diagnostic and goodness of fit tests.  The other categories for the 
legal characteristics of the firm are insignificant in all specifications.  In particular, it is 
interesting to note that it is revealed that public corporations are not significantly more compliant 
than other types of firms as was found by Rice (1992).   
  Most of the industry sectoral controls are insignificant with the exception of the service 
sector, which is positive across all specifications.  Firms in the service sector report between 2 
and 4 percentage points more of their sales to the tax authority.  This result is contrary to that of 
Giles (2000) who found that firms in the service sector are more likely to be non-compliant. 
  Firm size is a significant indicator of the degree of compliance across all specifications.  
Small firms (less than 50 employees) report approximately 3.4 to 4.8 percentage points less of 
their sales while large firms (more than 500 employees) report approximately 3 to 4 percentage 
points more of their sales.  Giles (2000) reports a similar result, whereas Rice (2002) found firm 
size and tax non-compliance were positively related.  Firm age and the number of competitors a 
firm has, are insignificant in most of the specifications. 
  Both Giles (2000) and Chan and Mo (2000) found that foreign owned firms are more 
compliant, and the results in Table 5 provide further support for this result.  Foreign owned firms 
report approximately 4 to 6.2 percentage points more of their sales and this result is significant   30
across all specifications. Chan and Mo (2000) report that export-oriented firms are more 
compliant and, at least in those specifications that do not include country controls, similar results 
are found.  The coefficient associated with firms that export is positive and this indicates that 
exporters report between 2 to 3 percentage points more of their sales to the tax authority.   
Finally, firms that have their financial statements audited are significantly more tax compliant.  
These firms report between 5.7 and 10 percentage points more of their sales, and this result is 
significant across all specifications.  The relationship between internal audit controls of the firm 
and tax compliance has not been investigated in previous empirical work. 
  Firms that perceive organized crime, the exchange rate, and high taxes and regulations as 
obstacles to doing businesses and report that government corruption is common, report less of 
their sales to the tax authority.  These results are significant across all specifications.   In 
comparison, Johnson et al. (2000) also found a positive relationship between non-compliance 
and government corruption but failed to find a relationship between compliance and organized 
crime and tax payments.  Our results indicate that government corruption has the largest effect 
resulting in firms reporting approximately 11.3 to 13.3 percentage points less of their sales 
followed by organized crime at 5.8 to 10.6 percentage points less.  High tax rates and 
burdensome regulations reduce reporting by between 5.2 and 5.8 percentage points and exchange 
rates reduce reporting by between 3.2 and 4.4 percentage points.  A positive relationship between 
inconsistency in the interpretation in laws and regulations and tax compliance is found, but only 
in those specifications that exclude country controls.   
  The region controls are also highly significant and negative, though of smaller 
magnitudes in the regression that includes the perception variables (Model 5).  This indicates that 
the perception variables are picking up behaviour previously ascribed to the region controls.  The   31
results for Model 5 will be highlighted, which indicate that firms in Latin America are the least 
compliant, reporting 12.9 percentage points less of their sales, followed by Africa at 7.3 
percentage points, Asia at 5.2 percentage points and Transition Europe at 3.8 percentage points 
less.  The coefficient for the Former Soviet Union dummy variable is statistically insignificant.  
  Table 5 also includes the coefficients for the country controls, considered in Models 3 
and 6.  Again, the inclusion of the perception variables leads to changes in the reported 
coefficients so the results for Model 6 will be presented in detail.   
⎯  Africa: firms in Cameroon and Madagascar are the most compliant, reporting 13.4 and 
17.6 percentage points more of their sales, while firms in Tunisia, Egypt, the West Bank-
Gaza, and Ghana the least compliant.   
⎯  Asia: firms in India and Singapore are the most compliant, reporting approximately 20 
percentage points more of their sales, while firms in Bangladesh and Cambodia are the 
least compliant, reporting 15.9 and 13.5 percentage points less of their sales respectively.   
⎯  OECD: not surprisingly, firms in the OECD are generally very compliant but firms in 
Canada, France and Italy are the most compliant, reported in ascending order.  However, 
the result related to Italy is somewhat surprising since Italy is perceived to have a 
substantial underground economy.  
⎯  Transition Europe: Slovakia is the least compliant with firms reporting almost 40 
percentage points less of their sales followed by Turkey and Croatia at 10 percentage 
points while firms in Slovenia are the most compliant reporting 22.8% more of their sales 
followed by Romania at 10.6 percentage points.  
⎯  Latin America: most will be unsurprised that firms in Haiti are the least compliant out of 
all other Latin American countries, reporting over 40 percentage points less of their sales.    32
Haiti is followed by Panama, Bolivia, and Trinidad and Tobago where firms report 19.6, 
17.2, and 15.3 percentage points less of their sales, respectively.  Chile, El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, and Uruguay are among the most compliant in the region. 
⎯  Former Soviet Union: contrary to the findings of Johnson et al. (2000), no difference is 
found in reporting by firms among the various countries in Soviet Union with the 
exception of Belarus, which is more compliant.  All of the other results are statistically 
insignificant 
  The regions included in this dataset are quite diverse and it is very plausible that the 
relationship between firm characteristics, and the perception variables, and tax compliance may 
be quite different across regions.  It would have been interesting to estimate our models 
separately for each region, but the sample sizes in these models were found to be very low, 
especially for the specifications that include the perception variables.  Consequently, these 
results are not reported. 
 
Conclusion 
  Very little is actually known about firm tax compliance due to a lack of detailed and 
readily available data.  The purpose of this paper was to use a unique and recently available 
dataset that contained information on firms from around the world to investigate the factors that 
effect business tax compliance.  This is one of the first studies to examine firm tax compliance 
using worldwide data.  The majority of previous empirical studies were confined to examining 
firms within a particular country, using tax audit data. 
  Overall, evidence is presented that shows that firms in all regions around the world 
engage in tax non-compliance, but that there is substantial variation within regions.  In addition,   33
while convincing results that the legal organization of a businesses effects tax compliance is not 
found, large firms, firms in the service sector, and firms that are foreign owned, are exporters 
and/or have their financial statements audited are found to be more compliant.  On the other hand 
firms that are small and who report that organized crime, high taxes, and government corruption 
are obstacles for doing business are less compliant.   
The findings do suggest a role for public policy, as well as actions to be considered by the 
tax authority and items for further study.  First, the findings suggest that administrations 
interested in reducing business tax non-compliance should consider reducing taxes, eliminating 
government corruption, and minimizing organized crime activities.  Admittedly, taking action of 
these issues is complex and involves more than just the tax authority.  Second, tax authorities 
should consider auditing small firms at a higher rate and requiring all firms to have their 
financial statement audited by a third party.  Finally, based on this study, it is not entirely clear 
why large firms, firms that are foreign owned, and firms that export are more compliant.  Further 




Table 1: Univariate Frequencies of Percentage of Sales Reported to Tax Authorities 
  <50% 50-59%  60-69% 70-79% 80-89% 90-99% 100% 
Frequency  696 489 365 514 685 826  2,450 
Percent  11.55%  8.12%  6.06%  8.53%  11.37% 13.71% 40.66% 




 Table 2: Countries Surveyed, Categorized by Region, and Number of Observations in Each 
Country 
Country Observations  Country  Observations 
Africa and Middle East  Transition Europe 
Botswana  57  Bosnia and Herzegovina  84 
Cameroon 35  Bulgaria  77 
Côte d'Ivoire  36  Croatia  81 
Egypt 56  Czech  Republic  86 
Ethiopia 39  Estonia  96 
Ghana 36  Hungary  93 
Kenya 55  Lithuania  27 
Madagascar 27  Poland  178 
Malawi 25  Romania  97 
Namibia 34  Slovak  Republic  22 
Nigeria 41  Slovenia  96 
Senegal 15  Turkey  98 
South Africa  70  Total  1035 
Tanzania 32  Former Soviet Union 
Tunisia 36  Armenia  82 
Uganda 54  Azerbaijan  82 
West Bank and Gaza  13  Belarus  80 
Zambia 40  Georgia 73 
Zimbabwe 59  Kazakhstan  75 
Total 760  Kyrgyzstan  88 
Asia  Moldova 82 
Bangladesh 36  Russia  429 
Cambodia 216  Ukraine  157 
China 81  Uzbekistan  93 
India 137  Total  1241 
Indonesia 68  Latin American and Caribbean 
Malaysia 41  Argentina  76 
Pakistan 69  Belize  21 
Philippines 89  Bolivia  71 
Singapore 85  Brazil  72 
Thailand 286  Chile  79 
Total 1108  Colombia  89 
OECD
1 Costa Rica  46 
Canada 94  Dominican  Republic  65 
France 70  Ecuador  50 
Germany 55  El  Salvador  60 
Italy 71  Guatemala  49 
Portugal 80  Haiti  67 
Spain 85  Honduras  46 
Sweden 79  Mexico 42 
United Kingdom  57  Nicaragua  65 
United States
1 77 Panama  49 
Total 668  Peru  77 
    Trinidad and Tobago  64 
   Uruguay  64 
   Venezuela  61 
   Total  1213 
Notes: 
1Denotes the omitted category in estimation. 
 
 Table 3: Data Summary 
Variable Acronym  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 







2.161 1  7 
Legal Organization of Company 
Sole Prop. & 
Partnerships 
 
PROP 0.373  0.484  0  1 
Cooperatives COOP  0.037  0.188  0  1 
Corporation   CORP  0.317  0.465  0  1 
Public Corp.  PUBCORP  0.116  0.320  0  1 
Other Business
1 OTHER 0.157  0.364  0  1 
Industry Sector 
Manufacturing
1 MANUFAC 0.377  0.485  0  1 
Service SERVICE  0.433  0.496  0  1 
Agriculture AGR  0.026  0.159  0 1 
Construction CONSTRUC  0.070 0.255  0  1 
Firm Size 
Small SMALL  0.410  0.492  0  1 
Medium
1 MED 0.405  0.491  0  1 
Large LARGE  0.185  0.388  0  1 
Firm Age 
<5 LESS5  0.262  0.440  0  1 
5-15
1 5TO15 0.378  0.485  0  1 
>15 OVER15  0.360  0.480  0  1 
Number of Competitors 
No Competitors  NOCOMPET  0.096  0.295  0  1 
1-3
1 1TO3 0.398  0.489  0  1 
>3 MORE3COMPET  0.506  0.500  0  1 
Other 
Foreign  Owned  FOREIGN 0.204 0.403  0  1 
Gov. Owned  GOVOWN  0.076  0.265  0  1 




AUDIT 0.634  0.482  0  1 
Secondary Parameters – Perception 








ORGCRIME 0.840  0.367  0  1 
High Taxes & 
Regulations 
 
TAX 0.738  0.440  0  1 
Corruption CORRUP  0.622  0.485 0  1 
Inflation INFLAT  0.896  0.306  0  1 
Exchange Rate  EXCHANGE  0.549  0.498  0  1 
Laws & Regs 
In consistent 
 
LAWS 0.422  0.494  0  1 
Notes: 
1Denotes the omitted category in estimation. 
 




1 (0,  50] 0  50 
2 (50,  60]  50  60 
3 (60,  70]  60  70 
4 (70,  80]  70  80 
5 (80,  90]  80  90 
6 (90,  100]  90  100 
7 (100,  ]  ∞ 100  . 
 
 
  3Table 5: Estimation Results 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
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Secondary Parameters – Perception 
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- -  -3.812 
(2.534)* 
- 
Asia  - -22.962 
(1.954)*** 
- -  -5.207 
(2.312)** 
- 
Latin America  - -19.161 
(1.831)*** 












Africa & Middle East
Botswana  - -  -11.448 
(5.508)** 
- -  -8.107 
(7.062) 
Cameroon  - -  -5.014 
(5.964) 
- -  13.364 
(7.527)* 
Cote d'Ivoire  - -  -2.481 
(5.951) 
- -  6.368 
(7.868) 
Egypt  - -  -38.744 
(4.723)*** 
- -  -30.289 
(6.739)*** 
Ethiopia  - -  -6.340 
(6.487) 
- -  3.809 
(9.040) 
Ghana  - -  -13.425 
(6.617)** 
- -  -10.673 
(7.380) 
Kenya  - -  -6.627 
(5.441) 
- -  3.445 
(6.088) 
Madagascar  - -  -1.339 
(8.618) 
- -  17.637 
(10.679)* 
Malawi  - -  -9.675 
(7.490) 
- -  4.511 
(9.251) 
Namibia  - -  -12.705 
(7.038)* 
- -  1.650 
(8.335) 
Nigeria  - -  -10.009 
(5.681)* 
- -  10.302 
(7.455) 
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Senegal  - -  -10.772 
(8.014) 
- -  10.207 
(21.433) 
South Africa  - -  -9.270 
(5.381)* 
- -  -3.805 
(6.308) 
Tanzania  - -  -9.189 
(7.627) 
- -  3.578 
(9.152) 
Tunisia  - -  -39.647 
(6.152)*** 
- -  -35.614 
(13.499)*** 
Uganda  - -  0.337 
(5.499) 
- -  9.972 
(6.841) 
West Bank-Gaza  - -  -23.098 
(7.896)*** 
- -  -21.761 
(9.195)** 
Zambia  - -  -8.855 
(5.951) 
- -  2.788 
(7.590) 
Zimbabwe  - -  -8.893 
(5.493) 
- -  3.892 
(6.550) 
Asia 
Bangladesh  - -  -32.571 
(6.089) 
- -  -15.863 
(7.497)** 
Cambodia  - -  -23.586 
(4.736)*** 
- -  -13.553 
(5.536)** 
China  - -  -40.528 
(5.679)*** 
- - - 
India  - -  6.395 
(4.701) 
- -  20.330 
(5.478)*** 
Indonesia  - -  -10.626 
(5.558)* 
- -  1.868 
(6.435) 
Malaysia  - -  -16.994 
(6.830)** 
- -  -8.228 
(7.632) 
Pakistan  - -  -21.470 
(5.755)*** 
- -  -5.378 
(6.410) 
Philippines  - -  -7.623 
(5.393) 
- -  4.477 
(5.968) 
Singapore  - -  23.842 
(7.003)*** 
- -  20.975 
(7.443)*** 
Thailand  - -  -21.984 
(4.339)*** 
- - - 
OECD 
Canada  - -  15.446 
(5.336)*** 
- -  14.707 
(5.986)** 
France  - -  16.509 
(5.719)*** 
- -  18.438 
(6.407)*** 
Germany  - -  -11.642 
(4.739)** 
- -  -8.010 
(5.485) 
Italy  - -  23.494 
(6.122)*** 
- -  25.493 
(6.813)*** 
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Portugal  - -  4.061 
(5.199) 
- -  2.805 
(5.878) 
Spain  - -  7.149 
(5.400) 
- -  8.441 
(6.075) 
Sweden  - -  8.692 
(4.986)* 
- -  5.679 
(5.553) 
UK  - -  8.629 
(6.575) 
- -  9.024 
(7.083) 
Transition Europe
Bosnia  - -  6.903 
(5.558) 
- -  4.532 
(6.442) 
Bulgaria  - -  -9.983 
(5.566)* 
- -  -2.576 
(6.509) 
Croatia  - -  -15.271 
(5.120)*** 
- -  -10.518 
(5.919)* 
Czech Rep  - -  -0.829 
(5.194) 
- -  2.929 
(6.030) 
Estonia  - -  -4.368 
(4.623) 
- -  -1.338 
(5.422) 
Hungary  - -  -2.542 
(5.115) 
- -  3.777 
(6.022) 
Lithuania  - -  -55.315 
(5.251)*** 
- -  -55.428 
(5.918)*** 
Poland  - -  3.663 
(4.653) 
- -  6.670 
(5.557) 
Romania  - -  1.097 
(4.645) 
- -  10.553 
(5.480)* 
Slovakia  - -  -52.784 
(5.249)*** 
- -  -39.279 
(7.032)*** 
Slovenia  - -  21.004 
(5.369)*** 
- -  22.808 
(6.106)*** 
Turkey  - -  -20.149 
(4.894)*** 
- -  -10.254 
(5.688)* 
Latin America & Caribbean
Argentina  - -  -11.528 
(5.378)** 
- -  -8.117 
(6.037) 
Belize  - -  -9.944 
(8.820) 
- -  -9.310 
(8.796) 
Bolivia  - -  -24.693 
(5.443)*** 
- -  -17.154 
(6.066)*** 
Brazil  - -  -8.792 
(6.192) 
- -  -2.489 
(6.766) 
Chile  - -  19.429 
(6.132)*** 
- -  19.148 
(6.648)*** 
Colombia  - -  -13.675 
(6.218)** 
- -  -6.950 
(6.889) 
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Costa Rica  - -  -13.329 
(5.868)** 




- -  -15.465 
(5.401)*** 
- -  6.308 
(5.932) 
Ecuador  - -  -18.607 
(6.228)*** 
- -  -5.397 
(6.960) 
El Salvador  - -  10.334 
(6.833) 
- -  15.846 
(7.212)*** 
Guatemala  - -  -11.383 
(6.140)* 
- -  -5.287 
(6.727) 
Haiti  - -  -52.132 
(5.659)*** 
- -  -40.420 
(6.450)*** 
Honduras  - -  8.990 
(7.106) 
- -  6.418 
(8.349) 
Mexico  - -  -5.407 
(7.256) 
- -  5.274 
(8.132) 
Nicaragua  - -  3.588 
(6.693) 
- -  10.255 
(7.544) 
Panama  - -  -26.292 
(7.092)*** 
- -  -19.619 
(7.518)*** 
Peru  - -  -11.063 
(5.210)** 
- -  -1.693 
(5.955) 
Trinidad&Tobago  - -  -17.070 
(5.311)*** 
- -  -15.326 
(5.827)*** 
Uruguay  - -  13.446 
(7.115)* 
- -  9.722 
(8.158) 
Venezuela  - -  -7.497 
(6.321) 
- -  1.143 
(6.874) 
Former Soviet Union
Armenia  - -  -0.933 
(5.049) 
- -  5.994 
(5.926) 
Azerbaijan  - -  -10.216 
(5.567)* 
- -  -4.313 
(6.089) 
Belarus  - -  10.474 
(5.253)** 
- -  14.198 
(5.917)** 
Georgia  - -  -2.249 
(5.865) 
- -  8.774 
(6.513) 
Kazakhstan  - -  -1.343 
(5.829) 
- -  9.308 
(7.029) 
Kyrgyzstan  - -  -8.823 
(4.488)** 
- -  -0.243 
(5.573) 
Moldova  - -  -7.465 
(5.453) 
- -  7.238 
(6.432) 
Russia  - -  -11.948 
(4.216)*** 
- -  -4.284 
(5.088) 
Ukraine  - -  -4.037 
(4.814) 
- -  3.633 
(5.588) 
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Uzbekistan  - -  -11.854 
(5.145)** 


















































Goodness of Fit 
Pseudo Log-
Likelihood Value 














































Observations 6025  4561 
Notes:   §  Robust standard errors (s.e.) corrected for heteroskedasticity are noted in parenthesis. 
              †  ***,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
              ±  d.o.f. denotes degrees of freedom. 
‡  Omitted category is
  1 “Other”, 
2 “Manufacturing”, 
3 “Medium”, 
4 “Between 5 and 15”,  
                            5 “Between 1 and 3”, 
6 “OECD”, 
7 “United States”. 
8    The functional form test uses as auxiliary variables the fitted values from the interval regression 
raised to polynomials of up to the fourth order. 
9    The homoskedasticity test uses all the original regressors as auxiliary regressors. 
10  Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) of the overall significance (OS) of the model tests the joint 
significance of the explanatory variables.  It is calculated as LRT=-2(L
R-L
U) which is 
distributed as χ
2 with k degrees of freedom where is the number of dependent variables (not 
including the constant term) in the unrestricted regressions.  The restricted regression includes 
only a constant. 
11   Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) of the joint significance of the additional variables (AV) (those 
added to the Model 1 or 4 specifications).  It is calculated as LRT=-2(L
R-L
U) which is 
distributed as χ
2 with k degrees of freedom where is the number of additional dependent 
variables (not including the constant term) in the unrestricted regressions.  The unrestricted 
regression is the model specified in the column in which the statistic is calculated.  The 
restricted regression is Model 1 or 4 accordingly. 
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